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AN ARGUMENT FOR THE BASIC LEGAL 
RIGHTS OF FARMED ANIMALS  
Steven M. Wise∗ †
Introduction 
The most abused beings in the United States are those whom we raise 
and kill for food. The numbers of dead are staggering. Most are victims of 
the severe and almost entirely unregulated practices that Americans permit 
on their factory farms. According to the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, in 2007, a total of 
10.4 billion land-based animals were killed by the American food industry. 
These included 9.4 billion broiler chickens, 450 million laying hens, 317 
million turkeys, 121 million pigs, 39 million bovines, 28 million ducks, 10 
million rabbits, and 4 million sheep and goats—fifty times the number 
killed in biomedical research, for sport, as pests, and for all other reasons 
combined, carrying a value of hundreds of billions of dollars a year. The 
degree to which animal enslavement is embedded in our society is difficult 
to calculate or fathom. In commenting on human slavery, slave historian 
David Brion Davis wrote in the New York Times that 
[a]fter decades of research, historians are only now beginning to grasp the 
complex interdependencies of a society enmeshed in slavery. There were 
shifting interactions among West African enslavers, sellers and European 
buyers; European investors on the slaver trade, which ranged from small-
town merchants to well-known figures like the philosophers John Locke 
and Voltaire; wealthy Virginian and Brazilian middlemen who purchased 
large numbers of Africans off the ship to sell to planters; New Englanders 
who shipped foodstuffs, timber, shoes and clothing as supplies for slaves in 
the South and the West Indies; and, finally, the European and American 
consumers of slave-produced sugar, rum, rice, cotton, tobacco, indigo (for 
dyes), hemp (for rope-making) and other goods. 
Brutalized as they were, at least human slaves in the United States were not 
eaten. 
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I. Legal Rights and Nonhuman Animals 
Twenty-three years ago, as officers of the California-based Animal Legal 
Defense Fund, Michigan State University Law Professor David Favre and I 
commenced work in earnest on a long-term attempt to solve some of the 
most desperate problems posed by the legal thinghood of every nonhuman 
animal. As legal things, nonhuman animals lack all legal rights and remain 
entirely the object of the rights held by us legal persons—that is, the beings 
with rights. We understood that, with the exception of those few nonhuman 
animals protected by such statutes as the American Endangered Species Act, 
it is extremely difficult to protect and advance the interests of rightless be-
ings in the courts. All legal history bears this out, whether those rightless 
things have been black slaves, women, children, the insane, or nonhuman 
animals. Most legal protections for nonhuman animals remain indirect 
(mostly anti-cruelty statutes), enforceable only by public prosecutors. Even 
the Endangered Species Act requires a human plaintiff to have standing suf-
ficient under Article III of the United States Constitution. 
Our years of practicing animal law and our knowledge of legal history 
convinced Professor Favre and me that no meaningful percentage of non-
human animals will ever be treated well or fairly until they attain some 
minimum degree of legal personhood—that is, until they achieve some 
minimum level of fundamental legal rights. All legal history bears that out, 
too. Precisely because whether one is classified as a legal thing or a legal 
person determines who dies and who lives, who may be enslaved and who 
may not, who does not count and who does count within our legal system, 
legal personhood is the most important individual issue that can come be-
fore a court.  
The arguments for the fundamental legal rights of any being, human or 
nonhuman animal, are strongest when they are most firmly grounded on 
accepted legal principles. Therefore, in arguing for the fundamental rights of 
a nonhuman animal, I rely upon bedrock principles of Western law: liberty 
and equality. Liberty entitles one to be treated a certain way because of 
characteristics one may possess. Presently for humans, some irreducible 
degree of bodily liberty and bodily integrity are everywhere protected. If we 
trespass upon this deeply personal liberty, we commit the terrible wrong of 
treating a person as a thing. Equality means that likes should be treated alike 
and unalikes can be treated unalike. 
II. Fundamental Liberties Apply Not Just to Humans
“In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free,” said 
Abraham Lincoln in his 1862 message to the United States Congress. After 
centuries of struggle, it is clear that humans may not be legally enslaved and 
they may not be legally tortured, no matter how beneficial their enslavement 
or torture might be to others. Today virtually no legal scholar or moral phi-
losopher seriously contends that rational arguments support a claim that all 
and only human beings ought to possess fundamental liberties. Yet these 
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most fundamental liberties are denied to every nonhuman animal. This not 
only inflicts grave injustice upon its victims, but underlines the arbitrariness 
of claiming fundamental liberties only for human beings.  
Dignity mandates fundamental liberties. Dignity is, significantly, a 
product of the capacity for autonomy and self-determination. Things are not 
autonomous. Persons are. Things do not self-determine. Persons do. This 
entitles them to fundamental liberties. Most moral and legal philosophers, 
and nearly every common law judge, recognize that a normal human pos-
sesses autonomy and self-determination if she has preferences and the 
ability to act to satisfy them, can cope with changed circumstances, can 
make choices—even ones she cannot evaluate well—or has desires and be-
liefs and can make appropriate inferences from them.  
I call these basic autonomies “practical.” Practical autonomy is not just 
what most humans have, but is what most judges think is sufficient for basic 
liberties. Any being possesses practical autonomy and is entitled to person-
hood and basic liberties if she can desire, can intentionally act to try to 
fulfill her desire, and can possess a sense of self-sufficiency to allow her to 
understand, even dimly, that it is she who wants something and is trying to 
get it. Consciousness, though not necessarily self-consciousness, and sen-
tience are implicit. 
How do we know when nonhuman animals possess practical autonomy? 
The more their behavior resembles ours and the taxonomically closer we 
are, the more confident we can be that they do. Chimpanzees, for example, 
are quite close to us taxonomically and genetically. Further, chimpanzee 
behavior resembles that of humans. They are conscious, probably self-
aware, possess some or all the elements of a theory of mind (i.e., they know 
what others see or know), understand symbols, use a sophisticated language 
or language-like communication system, deceive, pretend, imitate, and solve 
complex problems that require mental representation. We can therefore be 
highly confident they possess practical autonomy sufficient for basic liberty 
rights.  
The animals most commonly used for food (pigs, sheep, goats, cows, 
chickens, turkeys, and ducks) may have all the cognitive characteristics of 
chimpanzees. They may have none. Or they may have some; or perhaps they 
possess some simpler consciousness, are able mentally to represent and act 
insightfully, use symbols, think, use a simple communication system, and 
have a primitive, but sufficient, sense of self. The stronger and more com-
plex these abilities are, the more confident we can be that a being possesses 
practical autonomy. We do not know much about the cognitive abilities of 
farmed animals, because those who make billions of dollars exploiting them 
have never bothered to conduct significant research into what sorts of beings 
they are. A leading twenty-first century text on pig production, Pig Produc-
tion: Biological Principles and Applications, states that, despite the fact that 
tens of millions are raised in horrendous factory farm conditions then bru-
tally slaughtered, “[l]ittle is known about the behavioral needs of pigs.” 
Scattered academics have recently begun to investigate farm animals’ cogni-
tive abilities, but there remains little research on the subject.  
136 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 106:133 
In light of what we know—and we do know some things—it may be ap-
propriate to apply the precautionary principle that is often used in the field 
of environmental law. Depriving any being with practical autonomy of basic 
liberty rights—treating a being as a thing rather than as a person—is the 
most terrible injustice we can inflict. When there is doubt and serious dam-
age is threatened, we should err on the cautious side where evidence of 
practical autonomy exists. More than a million animal species exist. 
Darwinian evolution postulates a natural continuum of mental abilities. In 
Drawing the Line, I demonstrate that we know that all four species of great 
apes and at least some cetaceans, for example, possess practical autonomy, 
and that African elephants and African Grey Parrots probably do, too—or at 
least come close.  
We could deal with this problem in another way. Personhood and basic 
liberty rights might be given in proportion to the degree a farmed animal 
possesses practical autonomy. If you have it, you get full liberty rights. But 
if you don’t, the degree to which you approach it might make you eligible to 
receive some proportional liberties. This idea of receiving proportional lib-
erties accords with how judges often think. They may give fewer legal rights 
to humans who lack autonomy. But they do not make her a legal thing. A 
severely mentally limited human adult or child who lacks the mental 
wherewithal to participate in the political process may still move freely 
about. A court may give narrower legal rights to her. A severely mentally 
limited human adult or child might not have the right to move in the world 
at large, but may move freely within her home or within an institution. A 
court may give parts of a complex right. A profoundly retarded human 
might have a claim to bodily integrity, but lack the power to waive it and be 
unable to consent to a risky medical procedure or the withdrawal of life-
saving medical treatment. Elementary justice demands that research on what 
sorts of beings farmed animals are begin in earnest. 
III. Equality Rights and Nonhuman Rights
Finally, recall that liberty is not the only ground for the allocation of ba-
sic legal rights and that equality demands that likes be treated alike. Equality 
rights depend upon how one rightless being compares to another being with 
rights. An animal might be entitled to basic equality rights, even if she is not 
entitled to liberties, because she is similar to another with basic liberty 
rights. Equality rights require a comparison. Since like beings should be 
treated alike, something can only be equal to something or someone else. 
The strongest argument for equality rights of a farmed animal is simple: 
even very young or severely cognitively-impaired humans possess the basic 
right to bodily integrity, though they lack autonomy. Presently, such nonhu-
man animals as chimpanzees possess very complex minds, yet lack all 
rights, as they are things. This offends equality. To the degree that the ani-
mals we raise and kill for food also possess complex minds, the refusal to 
recognize their basic rights also offends the principle of equality. Only care-
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ful scientific investigations will answer the questions of what kinds of minds 
the various farmed animals possess. 
There is only one reason not to determine what rights farmed animals 
are due and recognize them. That is the reason that once justified human 
slavery: powerful economic interests are arrayed against it. This is a practi-
cal reason why beings who ought to have liberty or equality rights do not, 
but it in no way justifies it. I leave the last words on that subject to David 
Brion Davis:  
Considering that slavery had been globally accepted for millennia, it is en-
couraging that people were able to make such a major shift in their moral 
view, especially when a cause like abolition conflicted with strong eco-
nomic interests. We can still learn from history the invaluable lesson that 
an enormously powerful and profitable evil can be overcome. 
